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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the political implications of financial reform in the People’s Republic 
of China from the key reforms of 1994 to China’s entry into the WTO. It argues that the 
reforms implemented after 1994 in China shows a watershed in the evolution of 
economic reform. While the period before 1994 was dominated by dismantling the old 
system, subsequent reforms represent the attempt to build a new structure. But while the 
incomplete nature of reform provides the rationale for reform, it also provides the main 
obstacle for successful reform. Financial reform provides a case study of how the old and 
new economic systems are clashing with each other – and how the political interests 
associated with the old economic system are conflicting with those interests associated 
with the emerging new system.  
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This paper focuses on the politics of financial reform between 1994 and China’s entry 
into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). An important area for study in its own right, 
financial reform also provides an excellent case study of the political consequences of 
economic reform, and the relationship between political and economic paradigms. The 
reforms implemented since 1994 represent a deliberate attempt to make a final break with 
the old state-planned political economy. They were also designed to deal with two almost 
defining features of the post-Mao Chinese political economy - the growth of local 
economic autonomy and government support for the residual state owned sector.  But in 
effect, I argue that there is a lag between the introduction of new economic paradigms, 
and the adoption of new political paradigms by key political actors. Thus, while 
economic reforms might create a more market oriented system, many political leaders, 
particularly at the local level, continue to operate under an old paradigm more associated 
with a state planned system. In short, many political leaders use the new financial system 
to fulfil the old functions of the plan such as providing subsidies for key producers in an 
attempt to maintain social stability through employment. As a result, whilst the reforms 
have had some success in meeting their targets, this success has only been partial, and 
large sections of the financial system are effectively bankrupt. In this respect, Chinese 
policy represents a compromise between the embedded residual socialist system, and the 
dictates of economic reform. 
 
In many ways, the technical financial reforms are less significant for the financial system 
than wider political and economic choices and strategies. Financial reform is intended to 
reduce the financial burdens of supporting the state owned sector, but cannot be 
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successful until abandoning the state owned sector becomes acceptable to all within the 
leadership. But we should not simply explain the politics of financial reform in domestic 
terms, and neglect the importance of indirect and direct pressures emanating from 
China’s transition from (relative) international isolation to (partial) integration with the 
global economy. On a very basic level, re-engaging with the global economy requires 
supporting policy changes in order to attract investment and facilitate trade1. On another 
level, external actors have at times placed more direct pressure on the Chinese authorities 
to reform and to conform with international standards and norms - to play by the rules of 
the international economy.  
 
Perhaps the clearest example of this direct pressure is the financial liberalisation 
concessions to the United States that the Chinese authorities made in their attempts to 
join the WTO. It is particularly notable that if implemented in full, these concessions will 
strip away some of those mechanisms that allowed China to survive the East Asian 
financial crises relatively unscathed. Indeed, many in China believed that the key lesson 
from the crises was that China had been entirely correct in maintaining a relatively closed 
and controlled financial system. As such, debates over the short term wisdom and even 
the underlying logic of financial reform emerged as a major lines of cleavage within the 
Chinese party-state elites. And the way in which elements within the Chinese leadership 
have sought affirmation and political support for their policy preferences from external 
actors goes a long way to explaining the political dynamics behind the 1999 deal with the 
                                                 
1  Not just in banking, foreign exchange and so on, but also at a more basic level in simply legalising 
joint ventures, foreign ownership and so on. 
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US, and the final WTO protocol on Chinese accession. It also provides an excellent 
example of how shifting political alliances are a key element of economic reform. 
 
The Second Phase of Reform: Replacing the Plan
In some ways, calling the period after 1994 phase two of reform gives an impression that 
there was some sort of plan or model for future developments in 1984. While this was not 
the case, policy reforms after 1994 do mark a distinct shift from what came before. If we 
can characterise the period after 1984 as the abandonment of the plan, the period after 
1994 represents the (as yet) incomplete attempt to build a new financial system.  
 
Indeed, this failure to construct a new financial system to replace the old planned system 
in recognition of the changing nature of the Chinese economy is often cited by Chinese 
researchers as a major cause of financial instability. For example, Zhou Shaohua (1987) 
argues that “The central government's comprehensive management system has been 
dismantled while new economic pillars have not yet been erected”. Similarly, Gao 
Zhanjun and Liu Fei (1999: 55) argue that: 
“China is now in an important historical period during which an old financial 
system is shifting to a new one and the two are hitting each other ….New 
financial institutions and business lines are constantly emerging, whereas the old 
financial system has not been broken up completely, nor has a brand new 
financial system taken shape” 
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Zhou’s analysis was made in 1987, just three years after the central party-state leadership 
started to dismantle the old state-planned financial system. Gao and Liu were 
commenting some twelve years later, and 5 years after Zhu Rongji began to build a new 
integrated financial system. The similarity of these two assessments is testament to the 
size of the challenge to reformer and the strength of political constraints on economic 
reform. It is also a consequence of the assessment of some Chinese leaders that the CCP 
should not abandon the state-owned working class – either from ideological or more 
pragmatic considerations. 
 
You Ji (1991) argues that reform minded leaders essentially ducked the decision to push 
ahead with real fundamental reform in 1984 as they were unable or unwilling to push 
through market reforms in the face of opposition from more conservative leaders. Indeed, 
policy changes in the 1980s were frequently shaped by the shifting balance of power 
between different groups of leaders with different visions of China’s future. The death of 
key conservative leaders, and the general success of reform (in generating growth at 
least) reduced the intensity of those debates and conflicts in the second half of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that there is considerable suspicion, scepticism and 
at times downright opposition to the post-1994 reforms. 
 
The key reforms implemented after 1994 are most closely identified with Zhu Rongji. 
First as Vice-Premier with specific responsibility for banking reform, and subsequently as 
Premier, Zhu has been the most visible proponent of reform. And even though Zhu has 
overseen the appointment of a number of his followers into key ministerial positions, 
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Zhu’s policies have faced considerable opposition from within the broadly defined 
Chinese party-state leadership itself.  
 
In particular, Zhu was accused of over-zealously attacking inflation after 1994 at the cost 
of urban employment. He had set a target that through its secondary consequences placed 
price stability as a more urgent priority than job creation, It is notable that the loudest 
voices of criticism came from those areas of China where the residual state-owned 
system still dominated the economy. These areas had most to lose (in the short term at 
least) from the liberalisation of the Chinese economy; they faced the prospect of 
increased urban unemployment if loss making state owned enterprises went bust; they 
faced a decrease in local control over local revenues; and they faced increased 
competition from outside China in the wake of the agreement signed to join the WTO. As 
Solinger (1982: 71) put it in a very early period of reform in 1982: 
 “The most obvious bases determining which point of view a particular group or 
institution is prone to support are the province in which it is located and the 
branch of industry with which it is connected.” 
 
Notwithstanding China’s acceptance of liberalising reforms as part of the WTO accession 
protocol, the case for liberalisation does not have the full support of Chinese elites. On 
the contrary, there is no shortage of people who think that China should not liberalise its 
economy too early or too quickly – not least senior figures within Chinese financial 
institutions themselves2. There is also a strand of opinion that resents external pressures 
to reform – irrespective of what they say, it is the fact that they are external actors that is 
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the problem. There remains, then, a lack of consensus over the timing and pace of reform, 
if not the ultimate direction. As such, many of the post-1994 reforms were implemented 
in the face of considerable opposition from the very groups whose interests could be 
damaged by the reforms. 
 
Zhu’s initiatives are often referred to as a process of “recentralisation” (Lam 1999)3. 
While they are indeed intended to increase the power of the central authorities, we should 
be careful not to associate these processes with previous attempts to recentralise the 
economy in the 1980s. The intention was not to return to draw back from the market as 
was the case with the last serious attempt at recentralisation in 1988-9. Then, the then 
Premier Li Peng did try and restore planning control through the reintroduction of price 
controls, and by strengthening central planners’ control over investment capital (Renmin 
Ribao 1988: 17). It is notable that Li Peng himself argued that financial problems existed 
because “the old structure coexists with the new, we are faced with many new 
contradictions”. While Li Peng saw the solution to financial instability in returning to the 
plan (the failings of which had led to the decision to introduce economic reform in the 
first place), Zhu Rongji’s solution was to create new mechanisms of macro-economic 
control over the Chinese economy. Zhu’s attempts to “recentralise” the economy in the 
1990s was intended as one step on the way to greater economic liberalisation, not a 
retreat from it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2  Personal interviews with officials who have asked for anonymity. 
3  Zheng (1999) refers to these processes as “selective recentralisation”.  
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In many respects, isolating different areas of policy change misses the point that the post-
1994 reforms were intended to finally replace the plan with a new integrated and holistic 
system. It was a direct response to economic fragmentation and built on the premise that 
financial reform, fiscal reform, enterprises reform and international liberalisation had to 
be coordinated. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, the following analysis is divided 
into two sections. The first deals with the growth of local economic control, and the 
second with the subsidisation of employment and the growing debt crisis. 
 
Power to the Provinces? 
Decentralisation of economic authority to the provinces did not begin with the post-Mao 
reforms. Considerable power over local economic affairs was devolved to provincial 
level units in 1956 and 1957, and again during the Cultural Revolution. However, in 
these early periods of decentralisation, local initiative was constrained by both the 
maintenance of planning restrictions and targets, and the lack of local financial 
independence. Locally collected revenues were remitted to the central authorities which 
then used these funds to cover national projects and to redistributing wealth across the 
country. Thus, Lardy (1975: 57) argued that the key to – perhaps the defining 
characteristic of  - the old financial system was that there was no correlation between 
collecting and controlling finances. 
 
In dismantling the planned financial system in the 1980s, the central leadership 
deliberately and consciously created a link between local collection and control of 
finances. Indeed, as the central authorities consciously devolved considerable financial 
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authority to local governments, it might seem strange that they have subsequently spent 
so much time and effort in attempting to regain this power. This is in part due to the fact 
that in its hurry to find a strategy that would maximise economic development, the 
central authorities did not think through the consequences of reform, or coordinate policy 
in different areas. While individual policy changes might have had their own internal 
logic, they were not planned in conjunction with reforms in other areas. The planned 
consequence of reform in one area was frequently undermined by reform in another 
related area. It was not unheard of for reforms in different areas to totally contradict each 
other (Breslin, 1996).  
 
The growth of local financial autonomy, then, results from a combination of changes in 
fiscal system and the banking system in combination with the impact of the introduction 
of more market mechanisms. So while a loss of central revenues relative to the provinces 
was perhaps inevitable, as Wong (1991: 690) noted, “the magnitude and rapidity of this 
decline appear to have caught officials in China by surprise”. 
 
Revenue Sharing Reforms 
As noted above, under the plan, there was no correlation between collecting revenues 
from any specific territory and controlling the use of those revenues. This system began 
to change with the introduction of new budgetary arrangements in Jiangsu province in 
1976. Rather than setting targets for the collection and remittance of local incomes to the 
centre, the new system allowed the provincial authorities to keep any surplus revenues 
collected over and above the agreed amount to be remitted to the centre . A three-year 
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negotiation cycle also replaced annual negotiations. A slightly different method was 
employed in Sichuan Province where different categories of income were subject to 
different sharing rates, and a five year targets were used instead of the three year cycle in 
Fujian model. This latter model – what became known as the “Sichuan model” - became 
the basis for national strategy in February 1980, although different arrangements were in 
place for different provinces. For example, the three municipal provinces of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin remained under much tighter central control, while Guangdong and 
Fujian were deliberately granted much greater local control in order to boost local 
development (Donnithorne, 1981, Tong , 1989). 
 
But what happened next indicates the almost haphazard uncoordinated nature of the 
Chinese reform process in the 1980s. The amount of revenue to be remitted to the central 
authorities was based on an understanding that the local government would collect all 
local finances. However, this basic understanding was over-ridded by the introduction of 
a new fiscal system, but which enterprises were to be taxed on profits. Thus, most 
provinces faced a decrease in revenue - but their income collection targets were not 
changed accordingly. As a result of the problems facing provinces in meeting their 
revenue targets after the introduction of taxes on profits, most provinces turned to the 
arrangements outlined above for Jiangsu Province in 1982 (Yun and Li, 1983, Guo, 
1984). 
 
We should note here that the revenue sharing reforms were deliberately uneven, and gave 
some provinces much more financial autonomy than others. Whilst Shanghai's financial 
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responsibilities to the state remained largely unaltered by the reforms, other provinces 
were given special treatment. For example Shanghai continued to send around 70 per cent 
of its income to the central authorities, but Guangdong Province remitted only 15 per cent 
(Wang, 1988). As such, the first stage of financial reforms not only resulted in an 
increase in local revenues vis-à-vis central funds, but also resulted in inter-provincial 
tension (Breslin, 1996) and intense political lobbying to be given the same treatment as 
the apparently favoured “Gold Coast” (Hamrin, 1990: 83).  
 
Redressing the Balance: The 1994 Reforms and Centre-Local Relations 
The transition from the plan was (and remains) incomplete. It is clearly the case that 
market mechanisms now exert a much greater influence on the Chinese economy than at 
any time since 1949, and are likely to increase in the wake of WTO entry. Nevertheless, 
local governments remain crucial actors and determinants of economic activity. The old 
vertical dictatorship of the state plan where orders flowed directly down through 
ministerial and government agencies has been removed. But in many cases, this has been 
accompanied by the growth of a form of horizontal dictatorship (kuaikuai zhuanzheng) 
whereby the local government becomes the focal point for economic authority (Unger, 
1987). 
 
The 1994 Fiscal Reforms and Centre-Local Relations 
This growth of provincial autonomy and the loss of central macroeconomic control over 
the economy was a key impulse behind new financial reforms after 1994. The reform of 
the taxation system in is particularly important here. The reforms were intended to 
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redress the balance of fiscal power between centre and provinces by creating three 
categories - central taxes, local taxes and shared taxes. Importantly, the central 
government established its own national tax service to collect both central taxes, and also 
those taxes that are subsequently shared with the local governments (Zheng 1999: 1168-
9). Under the old system, the central authorities entrusted local authorities with the task 
of collecting and reporting fiscal revenues. The creation of the new national tax service 
was a sign that the centre no longer trusted the localities. 
 
At first sight, the fiscal reforms were simply an attempt at recentralisation. And in some 
respects, this was clearly the case. But the reforms also partially strengthened provincial 
autonomy in that they almost represent the creation of a quasi-federal system. At the very 
least, it represents another attempt to formalise an institutional relationship between 
centre and province that acknowledges the pivotal role of local authorities and local 
interests within this structure. Nevertheless, the immediate result of the fiscal reforms 
was to increase both the total amount of tax revenue, and also the proportion accruing to 
the central authorities rising from around 30 per cent to around 50 per cent of all fiscal 
revenues. The increase in the total revenue base can only be explained by either previous 
lax tax collection, or the deliberate underreporting of local fiscal revenues to avoid 
making remittances to the central authorities.  
 
It is notable that the tax revenue continued to increase in the 1990s despite the slide into 
deflation. This was partly due to increased customs duties resulting from a surge in 
imports. But it was also partly due to campaigns against corruption and smuggling 
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(particularly in Guangdong Province). China’s tax revenues reached the RMB 1 trillion 
mark (US$124.54 billion) in 1999 – up 13 per cent on the previous year. It is also notable 
that central tax revenue increased faster than local tax revenue – by 15 per cent as 
opposed to 11.5 per cent. By the end of the decade, the balance of centre-province shares 
of total tax revenue had reached 58-42 (Xinhua, 11 January 2000).  
 
Fees and Taxes 
On the face of it, then, the fiscal reforms were successful in that they increased the total 
volume of fiscal resources. More important, they partially redressed what the central 
leadership perceived to be a structural imbalance in the division of finances between 
centre and locality. However, tax revenues are only part of government income in China 
– indeed, only 40 per cent of all government revenue. The majority of government 
income is termed “extra system” revenue, which Gao Peiyong (1999: 41 and 45) defines 
as: 
“revenues whose regulations are formulated independently by various 
departments and localities and which are collected and disposed of by them as 
well…. If this state of affairs lasts for a long time, it will inevitably jeopardize the 
unification of national administrative orders and China’s long-term stability.” 
 
Complaints about impositions of ad hoc fees by local authorities rank high in the list of 
problems faced by foreign companies operating within China. But while foreign 
companies might feel that they are being treated unfairly, they are effectively being 
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treated in the same way as many Chinese companies. Essentially, anyone or anything that 
makes a profit is likely to face new fee charges.  
 
Local Control of Financial Institutions  
The importance of fees as a source of local revenue is just one example of how the 
Chinese financial system has proved difficult for the central authorities to control. An 
example of how the financial systems are moulded to serve specific interests.  
 
Another example – perhaps more important for an understanding of financial reform – is 
the way in which banking reforms altered the relationship between central and local 
authorities. In 1984 the People’s Bank of China was designated as the Central Bank, and 
four large specialist banks were introduced, each channelling capital for different sectors 
of the economy. Thus, the Industrial and Commercial Bank was responsible for 
channelling finances into State Owned Enterprises; The Construction Bank of China was 
responsible for new investment projects; The Agricultural Bank of China was responsible 
for agricultural procurement, and rural investment (including rural industry); and the 
Bank of China took control of foreign exchange business.  
 
This was followed in 1985 by a key transition from the plan, in that China switched from 
a grant based to loan based investment system. In order to facilitate the transition from 
central grants to bank loans, the power of specialised banks in the localities was increased 
in 1985. But in setting the investment quota for the new banks, the central authorities 
announced that the 1985 investment quota would depend on the amount of loans 
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extended in 1984. This move coincided with the extension of managerial responsibility in 
urban industrial sectors, which included lifting ceilings on staff wages and bonuses. As 
with the banking reforms, the amount of money allocated for wages in 1985 was based on 
the size of the 1984 wage bill and according to You Ji (1991: 71), “Many enterprises, as a 
matter of urgency, distributed extra money to the workers”.  
 
The move to bank loans sponsored a huge boom in investment in capital construction by 
local governments (Huang Da, 1985). While investment in state planned projects 
recorded a 1.6 per cent year on year increase in 1985, investment in unplanned projects 
by local governments increasing by 87 per cent. Crucially, while state planning agencies 
and financial authorities controlled the provision of 76.6 per cent of internal national 
investment capital at the start of the reform process, this proportion fell to 33.2 per cent in 
1986 as a result of the new banking reforms (Zhu Li, 1987).  
 
Despite exhortations from central leaders calling for restraint and a cut back in 
investment, local authorities continued to make the most of the banking reforms. It was 
not until Li Peng replaced Zhao Ziyang as Premier (in 1987) and implemented an 
economic retrenchment campaign in the Autumn of 1988 that investment spending began 
to come under control. As a World Bank (1990: 24-5) report commented: 
  “It has taken the People's Bank of China nearly four years, since its designation as 
a central bank in 1984, to gain a measure of control over credit expansion and 
deflect the demands of local government authorities on its provincial branches. 
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Earlier episodes of credit tightening in 1985, 1986 and 1987 could not be 
sustained in the face of provincial opposition." [emphasis added] 
 
Here we need to focus on the notion of dual control of local level organisation in China. 
Administrative organisation is built on twin and simultaneous functional and geographic 
channels. Thus, a provincial branch of a bank is vertically responsible to the bank's 
central offices, and ultimately to the Ministry of Finance. But at the same time, it is also 
responsible to the provincial finance bureau and the provincial government. The latter has 
the advantage of hands on contact with the branch, since it is in direct day-to-day contact 
with bank officials. Furthermore, it possesses considerable power in terms of allocating 
goods, services and personnel to the banks. Thus, while not formally an agency of local 
government, local branches of banks often act as if they are part of the local government 
structure.  
 
The power of local authorities4 to collect and impose fees and local influence (of not 
control) of local banks contributes to the characterisation of many local governments as 
running “dukedom economies” (zhuhou jingji) (Shen Liren and Tai Yuanchen, 1990). 
The notion of dukedom economy is not just that the local government is in control of 
finances etc, but also controls the judicial system as well; “Since courts and judiciary 
departments are subject to local Governments, justice cannot be brought along in many 
fields” (Xie Ping, 1999).  
                                                 
4  We should exercise care in assuming that there is a single local interest at work in each local 
authority. Duckett’s (1998) investigation of Tianjin Municipality, for example, found that different 
departments within the local government were following their own independent policies which 
entailed independent strategies for raising capital.  
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 While fiscal reform went some way to restoring the central authorities’ ability to control 
the national economy, it was, in itself, not enough. As we have seen, both the levying of 
fees, and control of local branches of central financial institutions shifted the balance 
away from the centre to the provinces. Furthermore, there is financial “chaos and 
mismanagement” resulting from the expansion of local financial institutions (Gao 
Zhanjun and Liu Fei, 1999: 53). For example despite a policy of encouraging mergers in 
light of the failure of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation 
(ITICs), and the decision to cut the number of central ITICs to 3 in September 2000, there 
were still around 240 locally controlled ITICs operating in China in 2002.  
 
In addition to the ITICs, there are over 50,000 small scale locally controlled rural and 
urban credit cooperatives in China today. By the end of 2001, outstanding deposits from 
all rural credit cooperatives stood at about RMB 1.73 trillion, accounting for 12 percent 
of total deposits in financial institutions, while outstanding loans by rural credit 
cooperatives were about 11 percent of the national total (Renmin Ribao, 2000). As a 
result of local control and horizontal dictatorship, many of these essentially exist beyond 
the reach of the central macro-economic control and central financial regulatory 
institutions. Indeed, this quote from Xie Ping (1999: 13) provides a succinct assessment 
of the impact of localism on the financial system: 
“a considerable number of financial institutions to be restructured are jointly 
invested by local Governments and controlled by them. It is local government’s 
intervention of senior management and business that cause the loss and 
 17
difficulties of these financial institutions. Consequently, upon merger, 
restructuring and closure or even bankruptcy of these financial institutions, on the 
one hand local governments are only responsible for liabilities up to the amount 
of their investment, but on the other hand for the local interest their intervention 
in the described processes are severe. Even judicial justice can not be guaranteed 
since local judicial departments have to obey the orders of local governments.” 
 
It is this concern with local control over local financial institutions that led the PBC to 
undertake a major structural reform in August 1998. The central bank abolished its 49 
provincial branches and replaced them with nine multi-provincial regional offices.  
“The purpose of these reforms were to put an end to local government (mainly 
provincial government) disturbance in monetary policies and financial supervision 
of the Central Bank; and to set free state-owned commercial banks from the 
intervention of local government.” (Xie Ping, 1999: 4) 
In addition to the general issue of local financial autonomy, the PBC reforms were aimed 
at facilitating fundamental reform of the banking structure in an attempt to deal with the 
technical insolvency of China’s major banks – a problem that results from the 
leadership’s strategy of providing a soft-landing on the transition from socialism. 
 
Safety Net Socialism and Financial Reform 
If the decentralisation of economic power is one defining characteristic of the Chinese 
reform process, a second is what we might call “safety net socialism”. The leadership’s 
desire for rapid economic growth has been tempered by a recognition that rapid growth 
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can be as politically destabilising as no growth at all. The issue of decentralised control is 
also relevant here, in that the central authorities have faced constant pressure from 
representatives of those areas that have not developed as fast as the coastal areas. But the 
main emphasis in this section is on the perceived relationship between unemployment 
(particularly urban unemployment) and social stability.  
 
Government Debt and The Subsidy Cycle In The 1980s 
In the initial period of reform, one of the major political tasks associated with reform was 
assuring key sectors that the new era would not harm their interests. Thus, for example, 
rather than liberalise grain production and supply, the government retained central pricing 
an allocation to ensure relatively equable supplies of basic foodstuffs. With the price of 
other produce increasingly set by the market, the government essentially controlled 
incentives for grain production by increasing the procurement price. In most cases, an 
increase in the grain procurement price subsequently led to an increase in urban subsidies 
to offset the impact on urban purchasing power.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, official Chinese figures showed that subsidies constituted almost 
a quarter of total central government expenditure. The political logic of reform was 
creating a subsidy cycle that was proving difficult to overcome. And while subsidies to 
maintain purchasing power were an important component of this subsidy cycle in the 
1980s, debt to maintain employment became a characteristic of the 1990s. 
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It is difficult to overestimate the importance that the Chinese leadership ascribes to 
maintaining employment. Particularly in urban centres, maintaining employment is seen 
as the pre-requisite for the maintenance of social stability, and perhaps even the CCPs 
continued grip on power. A quick survey of China’s employment statistics give some 
indication of why employment comes so high on the list of the leadership’s concerns. We 
should also bear in mind that China does not have a national system of social security. 
China developed a system of workplace socialism after 1949, through which the danwei 
in urban centres and the collective in the countryside provided health, education and 
welfare.  
“although China has been building socialism for nearly half a century, yet, the 
unemployment insurance system, one of the basic systems of a socialist society, 
has remained in name only. It cannot play the role of a social safety net. Once a 
worker gets unemployed, he would lose everything.” (Hu, 1999: 20) 
With no national social welfare safety net5, the costs of maintaining employment can in 
some respects be considered to be disguised social welfare payments. 
 
The PRC had a labour force in 2001 of roughly 718 million people – around a quarter of 
the world’s total labour forces and around one and a half times the combined workforce 
of all developed states. In the countryside, mechanisation and the replacement of 
collective socialist motivations with private and profit motivations resulted in the loss of 
an average of six million workers a year in the 1990s, and it is widely accepted that 
around 120 million rural workers are without work for most of the year.  
                                                 
5  Experiments in different forms of welfare systems are ongoing in a number of places across the 
country.  
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 One of the more notable consequences of this increased rural unemployment is the 
growth in migration – both state sanctioned and supported, and illegal. Not surprisingly, 
China’s poorest provinces are the major sources of migrant workers6. Neither is it 
surprising that many have made their way to the cities in search of jobs – to the extent 
that people with rural household registrations accounted for 29.85 per cent of the new 
urban workforce in 1996 (Hu, 1999). Rural unemployment is now very definitely an 
urban issue.  
 
The extent of the unemployment problem in rural China is clearly significant. But for the 
purposes of this paper, we need to turn our emphasis to the issue of urban unemployment. 
As Solinger (2001: 671) has argued, it is all but impossible to get a truly accurate number 
for unemployment in China, and “No one, and certainly not the central government, 
knows how many once-state workers have been removed from their posts”. Different 
accounting methods are used by different analysts, and official unemployment (shiye), 
figures do not include laid off (xia gang) workers – and workers can be laid off for up to 
three years before they count as officially unemployed. While urban unemployment 
increased by about 8 per cent per annum in the 1990s, the number of laid off workers 
increased by around 40 per cent a year. Thus, while in 1993, laid-off workers accounted 
for around 3 per cent of the total urban payroll, the figure had risen to 8 per cent by 1996.  
 
                                                 
6  For example, in Gansu, over 21 per cent of registered peasants working elsewhere; 20.6 per cent in 
Ningxia; 18.4 per cent in Sichuan; 18 per cent in Anhui and so on.  
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Two thirds of these laid off workers are from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and, as 
with all things in contemporary China, there are large geographic variations. In essence, 
the old industrial bases have both the highest levels of unemployment and the highest 
levels of laid off workers – 14.2 per cent of the pay-roll in Liaoning, 13.8 per cent in 
Heilongjiang, 11.2 per cent in Hunan and so on.  
 
So while the official unemployment rate remains at around four per cent, the percentage 
of workers without jobs is at least double that, and maybe even as high as 14 per cent. 
And this is the situation before any potential impact on employment from WTO entry has 
kicked in. 
 
Non-Performing Loans and Institutional Debt 
Throughout the reform period, the government has devoted a considerable amount of 
government spending on subsidies to keep loss making enterprises in operation. Latterly, 
it has also relied on loans from the banks to serve the same function. As these loans are 
influenced by political considerations and often ordered by government officials, they are 
sometimes referred to as “para-fiscal” investment (Wang Luolin, Liu Shucheng and Liu 
Rongcai, 1999: 6) and can be considered to be quasi-government debt. While the 
government debt balance as a percentage of GDP was only 8 per cent in 1997, the figure 
rises to 33.12 per cent if you include non-performing loans as part of the calculation (Yu, 
1999: 12). And even these figures don’t give the full extent of the problem, as those 
unperforming loans that will not be paid off, but which aren’t yet due, are not counted as 
bad loans (Wang, 1999: 35). 
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 The Chinese State Statistical Bureau announced that unpaid loans to various levels of 
government accounted for 10 per cent of Chinese GNP in 1995 (China News Digest, 15 
December 1996), while a World Bank (1997) calculation suggested that non-performing 
loans accounted for 20 per cent of the assets of Chinese banks. Looked at from the 
enterprise side, debts equalled 71 per cent of the assets of non-financial SOEs capital 
structure in 1995. As non-productive loans in support of political stability increased in the 
1980s, then the returns on assets of China’s specialised banks dropped from around 1.4 
per cent in 1986 to virtually nil by 1997 (Lardy, 1998: 100). And while the capital of 
state banks increased by 1.88 times between 1987 and 1996, the balance of loans 
provided by state banks increased by 5.25 times (Wang, 1999). 
 
It is difficult to come to an accurate assessment of the extent of bad loans in the four 
major state banks. The figures emanating from the People’s Bank of China are widely 
regarded as being politically constructed to present a positive confidence building image, 
rather than being based on firm accounting. Furthermore, the official figure of 25 –30 
percent does not include the RMB1.4 trillion of non-performing loans that had been 
transferred from the banks to Asset Management Companies (AMCs) by May 2002. 
These AMCs take over portions of bank debts, and then try to sell them as equity on the 
open market. So until and unless the equity is sold, it is effectively “debt” by another 
name. So the real extent of non-performing loans in the big four banks in 2002 ranges 
somewhere from the official figure of 25 per cent, to the most pessimistic calculations of 
50 per cent (Chang, 2002). Perhaps its best not to concentrate on finding the exact figure, 
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and just accept Harding’s (1997: 3) assertion that “In short, China's banking system is 
insolvent: its bad debts exceed its capital”. 
 
Dealing With The Debt 
Finding an effective to the debt crisis thus entails much more than technical reforms in 
the financial system. Rather, it entails a fundamental restructuring of the Chinese 
economy and a fundamental change in the basis of communist party rule. The national 
leadership has to find new ways of finding employment, new ways of providing social 
welfare, and has to accept and live with higher rates of unemployment. As reform of the 
financial system is inextricably linked with perceptions of the consequences of 
unemployment, processes of liberalisation and integration with the global economy are 
also brought into the equation. 
 
The initial reforms of 1994, however, simply dealt with the symptoms, rather than the 
ailment itself. The banking reforms saw the four policy banks replaced as policy based 
lenders by three policy banks. The State Development Bank of China took responsibility 
for long term projects: notably infrastructure, and the development of strategic industries. 
The Agricultural Development Bank took responsibility for procurement of agricultural 
produce and agricultural development projects, and the Import-Export Bank was 
established primarily to provide credit to promote exports. Theoretically at least, the 1994 
reform introduced effectively commercial banks for the first time, and also fostered the 
development of competition between banks at both central and local levels  
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The banking reforms highlight two key features of China’s reform process. First, when 
new systems are introduced, they frequently, indeed, typically, do not replace the old 
systems, but are grafted on top of (or alongside) the existing system. Thus, when the new 
policy based banks were introduced, the four old specialised banks continued to operate, 
and retained responsibility for all their previous debts.  
 
Second, despite repeated commitments to the independence of the banks (not least in the 
Central Bank Law and Commercial Bank Law, 1995), political interference remains a 
hallmark of lending decisions. Indeed, even the theoretical independence of the PBC is 
somewhat limited. Quite apart from the authority of Zhu Rongji over the bank whilst vice 
premier in the mid-1990s, the PBC remains a government department under the State 
Council, and the State Council is mandated to approve major policy initiatives (Xie Ping, 
1999: 5). The autonomy of specialised commercial banks is also strictly limited. As Chen 
Yixin (2000) puts it:  
 “With directed lending operations (especially those financing the working capital 
of SOEs) still ongoing, the specialized banks can hardly be said to be commercial 
in any real sense.” 
 
The 1994 reforms then essentially achieved little. They did nothing to deal with the 
existing bad debts of the now commercial banks, nor did they put an end to the extension 
of more bad debts in pursuit of political objectives. In an attempt to partially resolve the 
former, the government issued an unprecedented RMB 270 billion special treasury bonds 
on 18 August 1998 to replenish the capital of the four major state owned banks. The 
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bonds allowed RMB 120 billion of bad loans to be written off, and were intended to keep 
capital adequacy at above eight per cent for five to eight years. 
 
Debt to Equity Swaps 
Another solution lies in the extension of “debt to equity” initiatives. As noted above, 
these initiatives simply convert some of the debt of selected State Owned Enterprises and 
financial institutions into equity which are then sold on to private and institutional 
investors. In the first instance, the equity is held and managed by four AMCs established 
to help clear the debts of the four big commercial banks. Thus, Huarong handles the bad 
debt of Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, Cinda those of the China Construction 
Bank, Great Wall those of the Agricultural Bank of China, and Dongfang those of the 
Bank of China.  
 
One of the problems with the scheme, according to the Bank of International Settlements, 
is that the initial capitalisation of RMB 10 billion each is too little for them to survive in 
the long run7. Furthermore, it is only really applicable for essentially healthy companies - 
those who took out loans before 1995 and whose deficits are “mainly” results of the 
burden of interest payments8. Thus, it is an attractive option for those that are basically 
sound, but does nothing for the hopeless cases. Indeed, the scheme is so attractive that it 
has given rise to intense lobbying from government organisations that want to help 
                                                 
7  All four received the same amount irrespective of the extent of bad debts in their area. See China 
News Digest, 7 November 1999. 
8  The idea was first put into practice on a large scale after the default of the China Everbright Trust 
and Investment Corporation in October 1996. The problem here was that as the TIC wasn’t 
making any money, so those who took up the equity soon faced financial losses. See Xie Ping 
(1999, pp.11-13). 
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revenue generating firms in their own sector. And as Zeng Paiyan argues, if the same 
political pressure that frequently led to the creation of bad debt in the first place is placed 
on the asset management companies, then “the whole process will increase and not 
reduce financial risks and expenditures for the state”9.  
 
Bad Debts Revisited: The Politics of Employment in the PRC  
Again, these initiatives deal with some of the problems that are still affecting the 
solvency of state banks, but do not deal with the fundamental problem. Bad loans as a 
proportion of all loans remained high, and continued to increase. Effective reform is 
contingent on ending the strategy of using the banks as a means of subsidising 
employment in keeping with the party-state leadership’s political goals.  
 
In this respect, the most important reforms for the creation of a modern financial system 
are related to the position of SOEs within the Chinese economy – perhaps ultimately to 
the creation of a national social security system. As such, structural reforms, 
recapitalisation, debt to equity swaps and so on are not as significant as two 
announcements made by Zhu Rongji in 1998. First, Zhu announced that politically 
directed lending would end in 1998. Second, at the March 1998 session of the National 
People’s Congress, Zhu reaffirmed his commitment accelerating reform of the SOEs.  
 
The significance of SOEs cannot be underestimated for reform of the financial sector. In 
1996 four major state owned commercial banks held more than 90 per cent of all credit 
                                                 
9  Zeng was Chairman of the State Development Planning Commission. See China News Digest, 7 
November 1999. 
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funds and extended 90 per cent of them to state owned enterprises (Gao Zhanjin and Liu 
Fei 1999: 54). Even after the implementation of reforms, at the end of 1998, while SOEs 
accounted for 63.5 per cent of all manufacturing assets, utilised 70 per cent of the 
national budget, and employed around 55 per cent of all urban workers. By the middle of 
1999, the state owned sector had an estimated US$200 billion worth of bad debts (Hexun 
Caijing, 30 August 1999). 
 
The move towards final and fundamental SOE reform was tempered and at times put on 
hold as the leadership considered the social impact of rising urban unemployment. For 
example, when concerns over social instability resurfaced, new reactive policies were 
introduced to provide a temporary palliative. Indeed, rather than decrease, bank loans 
continued grew by over 10 per cent in 1999 (Zhengquan Shibao, 13 September 1999).  
 
This hesitation was partly a result of the delayed impact of the Asian financial crises on 
Chinese export growth. Export growth had essentially been relied upon to provide the 
opportunity to deal with problems in the “domestic” economy without jeopardising 
overall growth rates. It was a means of providing at least some new jobs to replace those 
being lost in the state sector. But falling demand in South East Asia, South Korea and 
most important Japan, combined with increased competition from the South East Asian 
states undermined Chinese export growth in 1998. Export growth for the year was 0.5 per 
cent in nominal terms – a decline of around one per cent in real terms (Breslin, 1999).  
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Chinese economists calculate that an eight per cent increase in GDP equates to a one per 
cent increase in employment (Hu, 1999: 15). If export growth declined, as it did in 1998, 
then this reduced the window of opportunity domestic restructuring. Furthermore, 
attempts to increase domestic consumption through interest rate policy were startlingly 
ineffective. There is little incentive for enterprises to invest and expand production as 
there is already overcapacity and oversupply in the economy. The prospect of increased 
competition from foreign enterprises in wake of the November 1999 deal to join the 
WTO has not exactly increased confidence either. Even as prices continued to fall, fear of 
unemployment, and the prospect of increased expenditure from welfare and housing 
reform were typically provided as the explanation for a lack of consumer spending.  
 
In particular, the uneven geographic spread of development resulted in differential calls 
for special treatment. Those areas that had gained least from integrating with the global 
economy, and were still major centres of the “old” economy, had most to lose from SOE 
reform. An expansionist policy thus allowed the central government to target those areas 
with large scale urban unemployment, and/or (typically and) where resentment at the 
uneven geographic wave of modernisation is highest. For example, in 1999, Jilin 
Province in the north-east received the biggest increase in central investment in capital 
construction projects (28.8 per cent) with Guangdong amongst the lowest (around ten per 
cent) (China News Digest, 23 January 2000). Neither was it any coincidence that the 
“look west” policy was reaffirmed (and Zhu Rongji charged to oversee it) as the national 
government tried to persuade representatives of China’s perceived peripheries that it was 
now “their turn” to develop.  
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 In some respects, the post-1998 expansionary strategy created the worst of both worlds. 
On one level, unemployment continued to increase. Simple demographics alone mean 
that about 8 million people joined the work-force in 1999. In addition, the economic 
downturn lead around 20 million workers being laid off in 1998 (1.3 million in Shanghai 
alone), and a further 10 million were laid off in the first half of 1999 (Hu, 1999: 19). The 
added welfare burden10 when added to the cost of the expansionary fiscal policy 
unsurprisingly resulted in a record budget deficit in fiscal 1999 of US$21.77 billion.  
 
Financial Reform and Opening to the Global Economy
The struggle to find a politically acceptable way of coping with unemployment provide 
the backdrop to an understanding of the relationship between the domestic and the 
external in financial reform. Viewed from within China (or by professional China 
watchers) there is a tendency to emphasise the relative openness of the Chinese economy. 
This is a valid view – China is relatively more open and liberalised than it was in the past. 
It is also arguable that the Chinese economy is more liberal than the South Korean or 
Japanese economies at similar stages of development (Economist, 1995).  
 
This gradual and partial liberalisation is clearly important and significant. On a very basic 
level, as China has re-engaged with the global economy, it has had to introduce 
mechanism to facilitate international trade and inward investment. It has also developed 
                                                 
10  According to, China’s Minister of Labour and Social Security, Zhang Zuoji, the government 
needed a total of RMB 24.5 billion (US$2.95 billion) to pay the basic costs of living of laid-off 
workers in 1999, and in August 1999 was still short of RMB 5 billion (US$603.8 million) Hexun 
Caijing (Homeway Financial News) 30 August 1999. 
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policies in response to the demands of external actors. For example, to attract and retain 
(rather than just facilitate) investment.  
 
Nevertheless, while China is much more open than it was before, pre-WTO entry 
liberalisation was limited in terms of geographic areas11, of economic sectors, and in 
degrees of openness to the global economy. Indeed, in the financial sector, foreign actors 
are heavily restricted in who can operate, where they can operate, and what they can do. 
For example, prior to WTO entry, only 25 foreign banks were allowed to conduct 
business in renminbi - six in Shenzhen and 19 in Shanghai (Zhejiang Ribao, 18 
November 1999). 
 
Viewed in comparison with other contemporary developing states (not least the crises 
states of Asia), then China looks relatively closed. And the lessons of the Asian Financial 
crises, particularly when taken in conjunction with the lessons of earlier financial crises 
in Latin America, seem to be that China has more or less got it right (although not always 
necessarily by design). As Yu Yongding (1999: 15) puts it: 
 “For many years, observers have criticized China’s slowness in developing 
financial markets and liberalizing its capital account. The Chinese government 
itself was also worried by the slow progress. Rather theatrically, the disadvantage 
has turned into advantage. Owing to capital controls and the underdevelopment of 
financial markets and the lack of sophisticated financial instruments, such as stock 
                                                 
11  Even through virtually all of China has now been formally opened to the global economy, 
international economic relations remain dominated by nine coastal provinces. These provinces 
account for over 85 per cent of all exports and around 80 per cent of all foreign direct investment. 
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futures and foreign exchange forwards, RMB escaped the attack by international 
speculators.” 
 
In particular, the only partial and incremental process of opening resulted in a limited role 
for foreign capital. Strict capital controls, the lack of currency convertibility, and the 
underdeveloped nature of Chinese financial markets had helped create a situation where 
90 per cent of all foreign capital in China in 1999 was in the form of FDI projects. And 
through a managed currency devaluation in 1994, the Chinese authorities massively 
increased the price competitiveness of exports compared to competing exports from the 
rest of Asia. The underdeveloped nature of Chinese capitalism allowed China to exploit 
its position as a “even-later” developer and also provided a bulwark against the 
international economy when it was needed during the crises. 
 
Furthermore, in responding to the impact of the financial crises, the relatively closed 
nature of the economy gave the leadership a degree of autonomy and leeway in 
developing a response that was not available in other states. Witness, for example, the 
extent to which export tax rebates were used after 1997 as a means of promoting export 
growth to the extent that China was accused of implementing a fiscal devaluation. 
Witness too the way in which the retention of capital and exchange controls allowed the 
Chinese authorities to reduce interest rates in an attempt to boost spending while 
maintaining the stability of the RMB.  
 
 32
In the wake of the Asian financial crises, then, the strength of the arguments for further 
liberalisation seemed to have declined. Currency convertibility was delayed, export 
rebates increased, many institutions lost their rights to trade in foreign currency, 
regulation and control of the stock exchanges was increased. As the Asian financial crises 
unfolded, and began to impact on China in 1998, then debates over liberalisation and 
globalisation were renewed. In fact, the crises were interpreted in two different ways. For 
liberalisers like Zhu Rongji, the crises confirmed the need to overhaul China’s financial 
institutions. China’s financial institutions were far less stable than those of pre-crises 
south-east Asian states, and it was essential to deal with this key and fundamental 
problem.  
 
For opponents, the crises undermined the examples of other developing states as models 
for China’s development12. In addition, as strikes and demonstrations against the closure 
of factories and unpaid welfare benefits increased through 1998, the social and political 
environment seemed appeared less conducive for economic reform than in 1997. Zhu’s 
position, and the political profile of the liberalisers, was further weakened by the failed 
negotiations to broker a deal to join the WTO in the Spring of 1999. One senior figure 
from China’s financial system said that he didn’t know what was worse – that Zhu had 
offered as many concessions as he did, that he offered them without consulting with key 
figures in the financial structure, or the fact that having done all this, he still didn’t get a 
deal. 
 
 
                                                 
12  And in particular, proposals to build SOE reform on the model of the South Korean chaebols lost 
much of its appeal. 
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In the wake of this failure, Zhu’s position as China’s key reformer came under threat. On 
a number of occasions, western news sources ran stories about Zhu’s impending 
resignation. As such, the deal signed with the US authorities in November 1999 to pave 
the way for China’s WTO entry marked a key political moment in China’s post-Mao 
evolution. Here, a new alliance for reform seemed to appear – one in which the Chinese 
Premier, Zhu Rongji, entered into an alliance with external actors and promoters of neo-
liberalism in opposition to domestic Chinese forces for conservatism. The WTO deal was 
used by Zhu as a means of boosting the reform agenda. At the same time, the US 
representatives used the deal as a means of boosting Zhu within China, and promoting 
both him and the reform process at a time when domestic considerations seemed to be 
pulling China back (or at least, maintaining the status quo). And this approach is 
enshrined in official US statements on the impact of WTO entry on China, summarised 
by an official White House (2000) statement of March 2000 
 “China's accession agreement will deepen and help to lock in market reforms -- 
and empower those in China's leadership who want their country to move further 
and faster toward economic freedom. In opening China's telecommunications 
market, including to Internet and satellite services, the agreement will expose the 
Chinese people to information, ideas, and debate from around the world. And 
China's accession to the WTO will help strengthen the rule of law in China and 
increase the likelihood that it will play by global rules” 
Nor is it just an American approach, as the EUs trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy’s 
(2000) speech in Beijing in October 2000 illustrates: 
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 “It can only lock in and deepen market reforms, empowering those in the 
leadership who support further and faster moves towards economic freedom”. 
 
There is already a considerable literature considering what might happen in concrete 
terms, ranging from wider global perspectives to individual industry case studies13. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the WTO deal on financial reform in China remains far from 
clear – not least because officials across China have developed new means of protecting 
chosen producers once the WTO concessions have been implemented. Whether the 
concessions that were agreed in are finally and fully implemented by the Chinese is also a 
matter of some dispute. However, in general terms, we can identify both direct and 
indirect implications for financial reform.  
 
In terms of the direct impact, The Standard Chartered Bank calculates that foreign banks 
in China can expect a 40 percent annual growth in lending in China in the next decade, 
with the four major commercial banks receiving the most competition (China News 
Digest 2 January 2000). However, representatives of foreign financial institutions 
attempting to begin operations in China are much less optimistic. They fully expect new 
barriers to be put in the way of foreign interests – with one expecting to wait a further ten 
years after China joins the WTO before foreign institutions can effectively compete with 
Chinese financial institutions.  
 
                                                 
13  See, for example, the Special Issue of The China Quarterly on China and the WTO, Volume 167, 
September 2001  
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The main indirect impact is on employment and in particular, employment in the state 
sector. Indeed, a research report from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued, 
“structural unemployment may be China’s chief adjustment cost for WTO accession” 
(Yu Zheng and Song, 2000: 1-2). Should the reforms be implemented in full, it seems 
likely that China's textile industry will gain through the phasing out of U.S. import 
quotas. But these gains could be dwarfed by the losses in steel, automotive, chemical, and 
machinery, computer and electronics industries, and in reduced incomes for China’s 
farmers. Notably, there is an expectation that industries where private ownership and (in 
particular) joint ventures dominate will benefit most, where those sectors where the 
residual state sector still dominates will be the main losers. In effect, a move towards the 
privatisation of the Chinese economy by other means, and a further transfer of economic 
power and political relationships and alliances. 
 
Conclusions
The start of the transition from socialism in China is usually dates as the third plenum of 
the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. At the third plenum of the 14th Central 
Committee in November 1993, the party leadership issued a decision which would 
theoretically fundamentally alter the relationship between the state and the economy. The 
decision outlined the need to reform the residual state owned sector, clarify the property 
rights of all enterprises, and to establish financial and fiscal systems that could effectively 
manage the economy by economic, rather than political, means. 
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Joining the WTO should represent a key turning point – the beginning of the end for the 
protectionism that has been a key determinant of the manner in which Chinese reform has 
evolved. However, two key question remain to be answered. First, whether the leadership 
have the political will, commitment, and perhaps even confidence in their own position, 
to see the reforms through. In this respect, the leadership has to come to terms with the 
reality that previous high levels of growth are not sustainable in the future. Second, 
whether key power-holders at the local level adhere to central policy rather than pursue 
their own local ends through licit, semi-licit and illicit manipulation of the financial, 
economic and judicial structure. 
 
As China joined the WTO, the problem of debts in the financial system not only 
remained unresolved, but the debts themselves continued to grow. High growth rates had 
been maintained through a recovery in export growth after the first impacts of the Asian 
crises in 1998, and through massive government expenditure. But the domestic economy 
essentially remained in deflation. For example, in April 2002, the consumer and retail 
price indexes in China were 98.7 and 97.9 percent of the previous year respectively, 
while investment in fixed assets and capital construction were up by 127 per cent and 21 
per cent respectively. Between 1996 and 2001, expenditure on capital construction rose 
from RMB 907.44 to 2517.9 (hundred millions) while expenditure to support agricultural 
production rose from RMB 510.07 to 905.3 (hundred millions). In addition new bank 
loans remained a major source of maintaining production, with a year on year rise of over 
11 per cent in April 2002.  
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After more than two decades of reform, the key challenge remains. What to do with the 
state owned sector during the transition from socialism. We should remember that the 
Chinese experiment has, by almost all criteria, been more successful than the shock 
therapy big bang away from socialism deployed elsewhere. But China is now facing the 
task of paying for its relative success in three ways – paying in financial terms in the 
guise of an insolvent banking system; paying in terms of increased obligations, duties to 
and pressures from the international system; and paying in terms of the (delayed) growth 
in unemployment.  
 
 
Financial systems and structures do not just emerge. They are constructed to serve 
specific ends. The case study of financial reform in China is a study of an attempt to build 
a new financial system to serve new ends, but the constraints that remain from the 
incomplete nature of reform and the residual importance of old political alliances. 
Financial reform, and so much else, remains shaped by and contingent on how the 
leadership manoeuvres between conflicting demands, and conflicting imperatives. In 
effect, how the leadership faces up to the task of finally dealing with the transition from 
socialism, and the long term political consequences of economic reform. 
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